Saturday, 15 September 2012

Buddhism and Mathematics


The Empty Set


Six aspects of mathematics which are relevant to  Buddhist Philosophy


(i) The foundations of mathematics have parallels (and differences) with the Buddhist concept of emptiness (sunyata)

(ii) The bootstrapping  of the integers out of the empty set provides a simple illustration of how causes and components can be expressed as algorithms and datastructures.

(iii) The further development of mathematics from its empty foundations creates computational algorithms and datastructures that can simulate all physical phenomena.  

(iv) These simulations epitomize the 'unreasonable effectiveness' of mathematics in physics and engineering, which suggests that there may be aspects of the mind  which are not explainable as the products of evolution.

(v)  The concept of 'algorithmic compression', which is an aspect of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics,  leads on to the Church-Turing-Deutsch principle, which gives us a workable philosophical demarcation between physical and non-physical phenomena, including physical and non-physical aspects of the mind.

(vi) The deep interconnection between the mind contemplating emptiness, and the workings of the physical world, suggests that mathematics may provide a bridge between ultimate and conventional truths.





John von Neumann




1) What are the origins of numbers?

In what way do numbers exist? Have they always been present as 'Platonic' abstractions, or do they require a mind to bring them into existence? Can numbers exist in the absence of matter or things to count?

The mathematician  John von Neumann, who was one of the founders of computer science, demonstrated that the whole numbers could be bootstrapped out of the Empty Set by mental operations without reference to any physical entities.

A set is a collection of things.  The empty set is a collection of nothing at all.  The empty set can be thought of as nothing with the potential to become something (that is to be become a set with at least one member).

The procedure is as follows:
The mind observes the empty set. The mind's act of observation causes the appearance another set - the set of empty sets. The set of empty sets is not empty, because it contains one non-thing - the empty set. The mind has thus generated the number 1 by producing the set containing the empty set.

Next the mind perceives the empty set and the set containing the empty set, so generating a new set encapsulating two non-things. The mind has generated the number 2 out of emptiness. And so it goes on, all the way up through the integers, to 42 and beyond.

So, the three modes of existential dependence (causes, components and mental designation) postulated by Kadampa Buddhist philosophy are apparent even at the very deepest level of mathematics.

- Numbers are dependent upon causes - the operations on the sets.

- Numbers are dependent upon components. The number 1 is defined as the set which contains the empty set and so on.

- And in the final analysis the entire number system is dependent upon the play of mind on an empty datastructure, in the complete absence of the need to refer to any material thing, or things, which are being counted.

Hence numbers are non-physical phenomena that make no reference to physical systems for their existence.  But they are not inherently-existent entities from the 'Platonic realms'. Numbers are dependently-related manifestations of the working of the mind.

Note - the Empty Set is not synonymous with Emptiness (Sunyata)  in the Buddhist sense, though there are parallels.   Buddhist emptiness refers to the ultimate unfindability of all objects existing 'from their own side' .  The subjective experience of Emptiness results from the exhaustion of all procedures to find an object (eg the classic meditations which try to find the real 'self').  


Buddhist Emptiness is a philosophical conclusion, not a 'thing', state or attribute.    The Emptiness of phenomena should not be confused with the delusion of a self-existent void.
 
Emptiness is the logical conclusion of the unfindability of a 'thing in itself' once every cause and component that is 'not the thing' has been removed from its basis of imputation.   Buddhist Emptiness always refers to an object whose 'inherent existence' has been refuted, for example the emptiness of a chariot.   Emptiness too is empty, and Nagarjuna warned against reifying it.  

The empty set, on the other hand, is what is left when everything has been removed, regardless of any original starting object.  This emptiness is then 'encapsulated', and in a sense it is reified, to make it logically and mathematically manipulable.



What the empty set represents is an 'encapsulation' of emptiness which renders it logically and mathematically manipulable for certain defined purposes. According to Wiki  "While the empty set is a standard and widely accepted mathematical concept, it remains an ontological curiosity, whose meaning and usefulness are debated by philosophers and logicians. The empty set is not the same thing as nothing; rather, it is a set with nothing inside it and a set is always something. This issue can be overcome by viewing a set as a bag—an empty bag undoubtedly still exists."  



Just as the defining characteristic of a chariot is its chariotness, which can't be found within the chariot itself, so the defining feature of the empty set is its emptiness, which similarly can't be found within the empty set; for if the empty set contained anything whatsoever it would no longer be empty.  So the emptiness of the empty set must itself be empty.

As with the failure to find the definitive chariot,  the failures of ones attempts to find a 'thing' is not an attribute of that thing. Nothing is to be found in the empty set beyond the conclusion that there is nothing to be found.

The procedure for mentally generating numbers by bootstrapping out of the empty set can be set out symbolically:  


0 = {} (empty set)
1 = {0} = { {} }
2 = {0,1} = { {}, { {} } }
3 = {0,1,2} = {{}, { {} }, { {}, { {} } }}
4 = {0,1,2,3} = { {}, { {} }, { {}, { {} } }, {{}, { {} }, { {}, { {} } }} }

See also http://www.mathacademy.com/pr/prime/articles/vnh/index.asp  and http://www.thebigview.com/buddhism/emptiness.html  



2) The simplest algorithm acting on the simplest datastructure.

The bootstrapping of the integers is one of the simplest illustrations of an algorithm acting on a datastructure.   There can't be any simpler datastructure than an empty set, and the iterative procedure of nesting the sets is one of the simplest algorithms one can envisage.   However neither the datastructures nor the algorithms contain any 'meaning'.
 
Their meaning, as it appears in terms of named integers (one, two, three etc used for counting objects)  has to be designated by the mind of the observer.    There is no concept of number, indeed no concept of singularity or plurality existing 'from its own side'.   Singularity and plurality have to be designated by the mind of the observer over some chosen object(s) or subdivisions of objects, eg leaves, branches, trees, forests.  

Counting is a mental projection, things do not count themselves,  see 'The Emptiness of the Eight Extremes' in Modern Buddhism.
God gave us the integers

 

3) "God gave us the integers"

"God gave us the integers, all else is the work of man" is a famous statement attributed to the mathematician Leopold Kronecker.  I'll let the theologians decide whether it was actually God or John von Neumann who gave us the integers, but what the statement is saying is that once you have the foundation of the integers, you can derive the rest of mathematics using a very small repertoire of operations. 
 

In fact, the integers (represented as binaries) plus the instruction set of a computer are capable of representing any other kind of numbers and simulating and modelling any physical system (Church-Turing-Deutsch principle)

It's quite remarkable just how few operations are required to equip a general purpose computer with universal physical modelling capabilities - fewer than twenty:  SET, MOVE, READ, WRITE, ADD, SUBTRACT, MULTIPLY, DIVIDE, AND, OR, XOR, NOT,  SHIFT, ROTATE, COMPARE, JUMP, JUMP-CONDITIONALLY, RETURN

 

 4) The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in science and engineering.

The remarkable efficiency of mathematics in predicting the behavior of physical systems has fascinated many scientists.

Einstein is said to have remarked that "The most incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible." This observation was elaborated by Eugene Wigner in his famous paper in Pure Mathematics (Volume 13, Number 1, February 1960) entitled 'The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences'

The theme was further developed in 'The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics' by R. W. Hamming in The American Mathematical Monthly (Volume 87, Number 2, 1980), which considered the predictive, as well as descriptive powers, of mathematics in relation to engineering.

Two surprising conclusions appear from these papers:

(i) Although it is a product of the human mind, mathematics is also involved in some strange metaphysical way at the deepest levels of physical existence. To quote Wigner:

"The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve. We should be grateful for it and hope that it will remain valid in future research and that it will extend, for better or for worse, to our pleasure, even though perhaps also to our bafflement, to wide branches of learning."

(ii) There is no Darwinian explanation for the presence of mathematical abilities within the mind. The ability to understand physics could not have arisen by evolution. Although our bodies may well be the product of random mutation and selection all the way from amoeba to man, our minds have some 'unevolved' dimension. To quote Hamming:

"But it is hard for me to see how simple Darwinian survival of the fittest would select for the ability to do the long chains that mathematics and science seem to require".

"If you pick 4,000 years for the age of science, generally, then you get an upper bound of 200 generations. Considering the effects of evolution we are looking for via selection of small chance variations, it does not seem to me that evolution can explain more than a small part of the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics."


Or Wigner again:

"Certainly it is hard to believe that our reasoning power was brought, by Darwin's process of natural selection, to the perfection which it seems to possess."

So we are left with something of a mystery. According to the materialist worldview, the mind (including mathematicians' minds) is an epiphenomenon of matter which has evolved solely to ensure the survival of the selfish genes which code for it. So why should this 'top-level' phenomenon have such intimate access to the 'bottom level' phenomena such as quantum physics? After all, the two levels are supposedly separated by less well-understood (in some cases) explanatory layers such as evolutionary psychology, neurology, cell biology, genetics, molecular biology, and chemistry.

Buddhists don't dispute that some aspects of the mind have been determined by evolution of the brain,  but there also seem to be highly functional attributes of the mind that have no evolutionary explanation. The unusual effectiveness of mathematics is one of these.

 

5) Algorithmic compression.

A very powerful aspect of the unusual effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences, is what is known ''Algorithmic compression'.

The laws of physics may be regarded as being analogous ('isomorphic') to algorithms, with the physical objects being analogous to the datastructures the algorithms act upon.  All physical systems can thus be simulated by a general purpose computer. This is known as the Church-Turing-Deutch principle

Algorithmic compression is explained in this excerpt from an article by Gregory Chaitin :

'My story begins in 1686 with Gottfried W. Leibniz's philosophical essay Discours de métaphysique (Discourse on Metaphysics), in which he discusses how one can distinguish between facts that can be described by some law and those that are lawless, irregular facts. Leibniz's very simple and profound idea appears in section VI of the Discours, in which he essentially states that a theory has to be simpler than the data it explains, otherwise it does not explain anything. The concept of a law becomes vacuous if arbitrarily high mathematical complexity is permitted, because then one can always construct a law no matter how random and patternless the data really are. Conversely, if the only law that describes some data is an extremely complicated one, then the data are actually lawless.

Today the notions of complexity and simplicity are put in precise quantitative terms by a modern branch of mathematics called algorithmic information theory. Ordinary information theory quantifies information by asking how many bits are needed to encode the information. For example, it takes one bit to encode a single yes/no answer. Algorithmic information, in contrast, is defined by asking what size computer program is necessary to generate the data. The minimum number of bits---what size string of zeros and ones---needed to store the program is called the algorithmic information content of the data. Thus, the infinite sequence of numbers 1, 2, 3, ... has very little algorithmic information; a very short computer program can generate all those numbers. It does not matter how long the program must take to do the computation or how much memory it must use---just the length of the program in bits counts...

...How do such ideas relate to scientific laws and facts? The basic insight is a software view of science: a scientific theory is like a computer program that predicts our observations, the experimental data. Two fundamental principles inform this viewpoint. First, as William of Occam noted, given two theories that explain the data, the simpler theory is to be preferred (Occam's razor). That is, the smallest program that calculates the observations is the best theory. Second is Leibniz's insight, cast in modern terms---if a theory is the same size in bits as the data it explains, then it is worthless, because even the most random of data has a theory of that size. A useful theory is a compression of the data; comprehension is compression. You compress things into computer programs, into concise algorithmic descriptions. The simpler the theory, the better you understand something'


In summary: If a computer program or algorithm is simpler than the system it describes, or the data set that it generates, then the system or data set is said to be 'algorithmically compressible'.  

This concept of algorithmic simplicity/complexity can be extended from the realms of mathematics into physical systems.   The complexity of a physical system is the length of the minimal algorithm than can simulate or describe it.    Thus the orbits of the planets, which seemed so complex to the ancients, were shown by Newton to be algorithmically compressible into a few short equations.

Related to algorithmic compression is the fact mentioned earlier, that the small repertoire of opcodes acting on binary encoded integers is capable of describing and predicting the behavior of all physical systems.


The computer model of the three levels of dependency
So causal dependency can be modelled as algorithms, and compositional/structural dependency can be modelled as datastructures, but where does that leave conceptual dependency?

According to Buddhist philosophy, the function of the mind cannot be reduced to physical or quasi-physical processes.

In Buddhist psychology, the mind is clear, formless, and knows its object.  Its knowing the object constitutes the conceptual dependency, which is fundamental, axiomatic and cannot be explained in terms of other phenomena, including algorithms and datastructures.

So the issue that separates the Materialist from the Buddhist is whether there is anything left to explain about reality once algorithms and datastructures have been factored out.  

The Materialist would answer that algorithms and datastructures offer a complete explanation of the universe, without any remainder. The mind is included in the overall scope of this 'computationalist' explanation.  


In contrast, the Buddhist would claim that the mind is a third fundamental factor irreducible to algorithms and datastructures. Hence the mind itself is not algorithmically compressible, but is responsible for carrying out algorithmic compression. 

Supporting this view one may point out that algorithms, as executed, do not contain within themselves any meaning.  For example, the following two statements reduce to exactly the same algorithm within the memory of a computer

(i) IF RoomLength * RoomWidth > CarpetArea THEN NeedMoreCarpet = TRUE

(ii) IF Audience * TicketPrice > HireOfVenue THEN AvoidedBankruptcy = TRUE

Neither do datastructures as stored in machine format contain any meaning.

Such considerations have led critics of philosophical computationalism to claim that algorithms can only contain syntax, not semantics. Hence computers can never understand their subject matter. All assignments of meaning to their inputs, internal states and outputs have to be defined from 'outside the system'.

This may explain why the process of writing algorithms does not in itself appear to be algorithmic. The real test of computationalism would be to produce a general purpose algorithm-writing algorithm. A convincing example would be an algorithm that could simulate the mind of a programmer sufficiently to be able to write algorithms to perform such disparate activities as controlling an automatic train, regulating a distillation column, and optimising traffic flows through interlinked sets of lights.

According to the computationalist view this 'Mother of all Algorithms' must exist as an algorithm in the programmer's brain, though why and how such a thing evolved is rather difficult to imagine. It would certainly have conferred no survival advantage to our ancestors until the present generation (even so, do programmers outreproduce normal people?).



The Mother of all Algorithms
The proof of computationalism would be to program the Mother of all Algorithms on a computer. At present no one has the slightest clue of how to even start to go about producing such a thing.

According to Buddhist philosophy this is hardly surprising, as the Mother of all Algorithms is itself NOT an algorithm and never could be programmed. The mother of all algorithms is the formless mind projecting meaning onto its objects (i.e. conceptually  designating meaning on to the sequential and structural components of the algorithm as it is being written).

The non-algorithmic dimension of mind, of understanding of meaning, is needed to turn the programmer's (semantically expressed)  requirements and specifications into the purely syntactic structural and causal relationships of the algorithmic flowchart or code.


[For people with a scientific education, the Turing Machine provides one of the most easily understood refutations of materialism, physicalism and the mechanistic model of the mind.  The argument is as follows:

- The behavior of all machines, computers and physical systems is reducible without remainder to the operations of a Turing machine.

- The behavior of the mind shows at least two functions - 'aboutness' (intentionality)  and qualitative experience (qualia) - that cannot in principle be reduced to the operations of a Turing machine.

- Therefore, there are some aspects of the mind that are non-mechanistic and non-physical.

See  Mind and Mechanism – Buddhism and the Turing Machine for a full explanation.]

 

6) Ultimate and conventional mathematics

The question remains of how mathematics, which is derived from the mind contemplating emptiness, gives such an excellent predictive description of conventional physical reality.  It may be that mathematics, in some strange way, acts as a bridge between ultimate and conventional truths.  Or maybe the bridge actually is just part of a loop, and what goes around comes around...


42) Conclusion: The ultimate, fundamental nature of life the universe and everything


So let's combine reductionism with the fundamentals of mathematics:
- The structures and operations of mathematics are reducible to the structures and operations of the mind.

- The structures and  operations of the mind are reducible to the structures and operations of biological macromolecules.
 

- The structures and operations of biological macromolecules are reducible to the structures and operations of organic chemicals.

- The structures and operations of organic chemicals are reducible to the structures and operations of atoms.

- The structures and operations of atoms are reducible to the structures and operations of mathematics.

- The structures and operations of mathematics are reducible to the structures and operations of the mind.

-  which is where we came in!




This allows us to draw the following equally valid conclusions:

(i)  Matter is fundamental
(ii)  Mind is fundamental
(iii)  Both mind and matter are fundamental
(iv) Neither mind nor matter are fundamental
(v) Nothing is fundamental
(vi)  Forty two


- Sean Robsville



Related posts

Confronting Materialism and the Delusion of the Mechanistic Mind

Mind and Mechanism – Buddhism and the Turing Machine

The Four Philosophical Foundations of Buddhism

Buddhism and Science

Evolution, Emptiness and Delusions of the Darwinian Mind  

The Church-Turing-Deutsch Principle and Buddhist Philosophy

Nonalgorithmic phenomena

Ultimate and Conventional Truths

Algorithms, Data Structures and Mental Attribution

Sunyata - the emptiness of all things

Bridging the Explanatory Gap of the Hard Problem 

Minds, Machines and Meaning

All Watched over by Machines of Loving Grace

Buddhism, Sentience, Dukkha, Evolution and the Mind




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Wednesday, 4 July 2012

Buddhism and Science




When religion and science collide.

Stephen Jay Gould  suggested that science and religion should occupy separate or non-overlapping magisteria (NOMA), with science leaving religion alone and vice versa.  However, many critics have pointed out that this won't work as long as religion makes 'truth' claims which are contradicted by scientific evidence, such as the age of the earth being 6000 years, species being created as separate entities by God, and all humans being descended from Adam and Eve, who have 'fallen' due to the activities of a talking snake.

By some process unknown to geneticists, this 'fall' has transmitted 'original sin' to all Adam and Eve's descendants. Consequently all the people on earth  are now sinners and have incurred both God's holy wrath and their own shame and guilt  (even without doing anything!). All are therefore in utter need of redemption by the One True Religion.

So the belief in Creationism, Adam and Eve, original sin etc goes way beyond just upholding a primitive creation myth.  The entire theology of most Abrahamic sects is based on the truth of Genesis


Those of us familiar with the Abrahamic religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) have grown up expecting religion to be in conflict with science, as it has been since the time of Galileo.    The conflict is getting worse, with Christian groups trying to censor evolution and promote Creationism in the classroom (in England, Korea and America), and Muslim groups issuing death fatwas for people who teach evolution.  Part of the reason for the conflict is that scientists and religious people have very different criteria for the truth, with faith being more important than reason for religious believers.





Scientific vs Religious Truth

The truths of science are open, verifiable and repeatable.   Results of scientific experiments are published with sufficient methodological detail to allow them to be checked, confirmed and repeated by persons other than the experimenter.

In contrast, the 'truths' of the Abrahamic religions are closed, unverifiable and unrepeatable.  They were revealed to one or a few 'prophets', once only, a long time ago, and no-one has had a similar experience since (or if they have, they've been burned as heretics).

Fortunately, Buddhism is more like science than the Abrahamic religions, in that it claims that Buddha's mental experiments can be repeated by anyone who follows the correct meditational procedures, from early 'realisations', all the way up to a total escape from the limitations that our biological existence has placed on our minds.

Buddha didn't expect his students to believe what he said just on his authority, but advised them to test his teachings for themselves.  


Also, Buddhism doesn't have any creation myth to defend. Consequently the conflicts between science and Buddhism are conflicts of interpretation rather than fact.   Indeed, it could be said that there is no conflict between Buddhism and science as such, but only between Buddhism and one particular view of science, the view that is known as 'Scientism'.

How Buddhism views the world.

The Buddhist view of the world differs from our 'commonsense' and conventional view, and also from that of classical (pre 20th century) science. It does however have close similarities with  modern science, especially with fundamental physics, evolutionary biology and information science.  Buddhist philosophy is based on the Madhyamaka ('Middle Way') view, as developed by Nagarjuna who lived around 150 - 250 AD.


The characteristics of the middle way view are:

(1) All things exist and can be known only in terms of their causes, effects and  interactions with other things.  Nothing is self-defined, or a 'thing-in-itself' existing either 'from its own side'  or as an instantiation of an inherently existent universal ideal form.   These concepts can be difficult to grasp in our ordinary experience, but become more obvious as we study quantum physics (to negate inherent existence - the view that  things exist from their own side) and evolutionary biology (to negate essentialism - the belief that  things exist as instantiations of ideal forms).


(2) All functioning things are both composite (composed of parts), and impermanent (subject to continual change).

Even fundamental particles such as electrons aren't unitary points, but are composed of infinite numbers of probabilistic parts.   And even empty space is impermanent, a seething mass of energy fluctuations and virtual particles popping into and out of existence, and causing perpetual fluctuations in all the particles that occupy space. 


(3) Since they do not exist inherently, or by reference to 'inherently existing other' (ideal forms), all phenomena exist in terms of three factors: (i) Their causes (ii) Their composition (iii) Their categorization by the mind of an observer (however the categories to which things are assigned exist in the mind, and only in the mind)


(4)  Because phenomena are interrelated and impermanent, Buddhism views the world as a system of interconnected processes rather than isolated things.  Relationships take precedence over things-in-themselves, long lasting things endure rather than exist, and becoming is more important than being.  In western terminology the Madhyamaka would be classed as a process philosophy. 



How science views the world: then and now, classical versus modern science.

Up until about the middle of the nineteenth century, essentialism and inherent existence were dominant in science, but since then both have been refuted and replaced by conceptualism and interdependence.
  

Chemistry

Chemistry provided a bastion for essentialism up to the late nineteenth century. All substances were composed of atoms of about 80 (then) known elements. Every atom of a particular element was identical with another atom of the same element, and derived its properties from the essential nature of that element. The atom was fundamental and unchangeable.

The first hint of atomic substructures came from the work of Mendeleev, who published his periodic table in 1869. He left gaps in his table for as yet undiscovered elements and was able to predict their properties.

Work on radioactivity in the early 20th century demonstrated that atoms were not fundamental but were composed of elementary particles - electrons, protons and neutrons. But these elementary particles did not act like classical 'things'. They were only knowable by interactions with other particles, and the mere act of observation changed their properties in an indeterminate way. 

Radioactivity also demonstrated the phenomenon of subtle impermanence, where the seething impermanence of the quantum vacuum interacted with unstable nuclei to force them to disintegrate in a probabilistic rather than deterministic manner.


Evolution and Genesis

'The Origin of the Species' was the first major blow against essentialism in the West. In 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' Daniel Dennett says ' Even today Darwin's overthrow of essentialism has not been completely assimilated .... the Darwinian mutation, which at first seemed to be just a new way of thinking about kinds in biology, can spread to other phenomena and other disciplines, as we shall see. There are persistent problems both inside and outside biology that readily dissolve once we adopt the Darwinian perspective on what makes a thing the sort of thing it is, but the tradition-bound resistance to this idea persists.'


Quantum physics

The worldview of quantum physics differs radically from that of classical physics. Classical physics regards the universe as being composed of clearly-defined building blocks ('things') which are specified by their own internal properties. Quantum physics sees the universe as an ever-changing set of relationships between entities which can be defined only in terms of those relationships.    The nature of these entities changes radically according to how they are observed. If you set up your experiment to observe them as particles, then they behaved as particles. If you set it up to observe them as waves, then they behaved as waves.  

From Wiki
"For example, the particle and wave aspects of physical objects are such complementary phenomena. Both concepts are borrowed from classical mechanics, and measurements (e.g., the double-slit experiment) can demonstrate one or the other, but not both, phenomena at a particular moment. The principle of complementarity explains this as being due to the very nature of the measuring devices used. A measuring device may be designed to demonstrate either the particle or wave aspects, but the demonstration of one necessarily precludes the possibility of simultaneously demonstrating the other, because the object being measured is unavoidably affected by the measurement. It is impossible to design a measuring device that demonstrates both phenomena simultaneously not because of lack of creativity on the part of the experimenter, but simply because such a device is literally inconceivable. Moreover, Bohr implies that it is not possible to regard objects governed by quantum mechanics as having intrinsic properties independent of determination with a measuring device."    



Scientism and physicalism

Although Buddhist philosophy is in close agreement with the facts of science, it does disagree with one particular interpretation of science, known as scientism.

Scientism is the belief that the methods of natural science, or the categories and things recognized in natural science, form the only proper elements in any philosophical or other enquiry, or that science, and only science, describes the world as it is in itself, independent of perspective with a concomitant elimination of the psychological dimensions of experience.

Physicalism is a reductionist expression of scientism which holds that everything which exists is no more extensive than its physical properties; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things:
 

"According to physicalism, the language of physics is the universal language of science and, consequently, any knowledge can be brought back to the statements on the physical objects."

In contemporary philosophy, physicalism is most frequently associated with the mind-body problem in philosophy of mind, regarding which physicalism holds that all that has been ascribed to "mind" is more correctly ascribed to "brain" or the activity of the brain. Physicalism is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it has evolved with the physical sciences to incorporate far more sophisticated notions of physicality than matter, for example wave/particle relationships and non-material forces produced by particles.   

So both scientism and physicalism assert that the mind and all its products and processes can be reduced to the laws of physics operating on physical structures (ie biochemical reactions and physiological processes within the neurones of the brain).  

Buddhist philosophy disagrees with this, and asserts that physical causality and physical processes are in themselves incapable of producing mind.    Buddhism regards mind as an axiomatic feature of the universe, which cannot be reduced to physical mechanisms. 



Physical versus non-physical mind


Fortunately we have a precise definition of what is physical, and consequently what is non-physical, due to the work of the great Buddhist philosopher, mathematician and code-breaker Alan Turing.   Turing showed that any system which has a physical basis can be modelled and explained in terms of algorithms and data structures.  For practical purposes this means that any physical system can be modelled and explained by reduction to computer procedures acting on inputs, outputs and database tables.

Algorithms are of vital importance in modern science, and the usefulness of any scientific model can be judged by its algorithmic compression, which means how much simpler the simulation, or explanation is, than the phenomena that it describes.

Following on from Turing's work, Buddhist and other non-physicalist philosophers have sought to refute scientism and physicalism by producing examples of phenomena that cannot in principle be reduced to algorithms and datastructures, but which can be processed by the human mind.


For a discussion of why the mind is a non-physical, fundamental aspect of the universe which is not derived from anything else, see Confronting Materialism and the Delusion of the Mechanistic Mind  and  Mind and Mechanism – Buddhism and the Turing Machine.

- Sean Robsville


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Saturday, 9 June 2012

Apoha, Universals in Buddhist Logic, Stencils and the Game of Twenty Questions



The problem of 'universals

- When you see a small feathered creature perched in a tree, how do you know it's a bird?

- When you see a fluffy long-eared creature vanishing down a hole, how do you know it's a rabbit?

- When you taste a cold, sweet vanilla-flavored food with a smooth texture, how do you know it's an ice-cream?

This is the philosophical problem of 'universals', of how our minds assign individual things to general categories, types or kinds.     


These categories, types and kinds of things are known as 'universals', whereas the individual examples are known as 'instantiations' or 'particulars'.  Thus Mungo Jerrie and Rumpelteazer are both instantiations of the universal form of cats.


Types, kinds, categories, species


The problem of universals can be split into two questions:


(i) How and where do these universals exist (assuming they even do exist)?

(ii) If universals do exist, how does our mind interact with them, to access and recognize the correct category in which to place individually observed objects?



There are three different views on how (and if) these universals exist: Essentialism, Conceptualism and Nominalism:

 

1 Essentialism

Essentialism (sometimes known as 'Platonism' or, rather confusingly, as 'Realism') states that universals really do exist outside the mind of the beholder.  There is an ideal form of 'cat' in which Mungo Jerrie and Rumpelteazer participate. Their inherent 'cattiness', which is derived from the ideal form of cat, is essential to them being what they are.  

When applied to animals and their evolution, the essentialist view is very much linked to the creationist doctrine of separate unchanging and unchangeable species.


2. Conceptualism

Conceptualism states that universals do exist, but only in the mind of the observer. 

Thus if you cut the sides of a box down a millimeter at a time, at some arbitrary time it will cease to appear as a box and suddenly become a tray.  


Similarly, Milinda's chariot came into and went out of existence depending on Milinda's arbitrary recognition of its stage of assembly and disassembly

As regards kinds, types and species of living things, conceptualism regards species not as distinct unchanging categories, but as overlapping  evolving populations.   They are not objectively real, independently of a human observer.  This view was illustrated by Richard Dawkins' famous Granny Chain thought experiment, where ancestral humans and ancestral chimpanzees hold hands all the way back to their common ancestor.


3. Nominalism

Nominalism states that universals only exist as names, and are completely dependent upon our use of language. Thus the Samis have 52 different words for types of snow and hence 52 different snowy universals.

An argument against nominalism is that we can have perfectly valid concepts of universals without the use of language.   Some of us may be able to remember early childhood when we first learned the name of a class of object, but had a concept of its type before we knew what is was called. I can remember asking my mother 'What's that?' as she reached a pan down from the kitchen shelf, and on being told it was a pan, I knew the word 'pan'  applied to all the similar utensils on the shelf.   


And as the years advance, we occasionally revert to being pre-linguistic, with the 'tip of the tongue' phenomenon, where we have a very clear concept of a thingy, or what-not, or what-d'you-call-it, but just can't remember its name.

So maybe the reason the Samis have so many different words for types of snow is they need to communicate these concepts as a result of their environment and livelihood, and not because the pre-existing structure or richness of the Sami vocabulary created these different categories of snow out of mere words.   


Language is the servant of concepts, not vice versa.


Buddhist Conceptualism

As usual, Buddhism takes the middle way between essentialism and nominalism. The Madhyamaka ('Middle Way')  rejects essentialism but nevertheless regards universals as more than mere words, they are known as 'generic images' or 'generally characterized phenomena'. They exist in the mind, but only in the mind.

So how does our mind construct, access and recognize generic images as the correct categories in which to place individually observed objects?


There are two possible ways for the mind to assign a newly observed phenomenon to a category:


(i)   Look through a mental catalog of everything that is known, and find the closest match. 


(ii)  Use a taxonomic  or cladistic approach of following a decision tree and rejecting everything that is not relevant to identifying the unknown object. This is exemplified by the game of 'Twenty Questions', where every known object can be identified by a process of exclusion using twenty or so mental operations.

Twenty iterations of a binary search will generate
a 'logical hole' corresponding to a generic image.

 "The game suggests that the information (as measured by Shannon's entropy statistic) required to identify an arbitrary object is at most 20 bits. The game is often used as an example when teaching people about information theory. Mathematically, if each question is structured to eliminate half the objects, 20 questions will allow the questioner to distinguish between 2**20 or 1,048,576 objects. Accordingly, the most effective strategy for Twenty Questions is to ask questions that will split the field of remaining possibilities roughly in half each time. The process is analogous to a binary search algorithm in computer science or successive approximation ADC in analog-to-digital signal conversion." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty_Questions

 

Obviously a search mechanism that can reach its target in twenty or so operations is going to be preferable to one that on average is destined to plough through half of a catalog containing everything that there is in order to find a match. (The catalog has no index, since this would be begging the question: the mind would need to already know the name of what it was looking at in order to use an index)

The evolutionary advantages are clearly with the fewest steps. In the catalog method, by the time you've recognized the long coiled thing at your feet as a snake, you're already dead.   

Of course there is a trade-off. The catalog approach is more accurate than the taxonomic method, so with the fast method you may occasionally mistake a coiled rope at dusk for a snake.
 

Buddhist philosophers claim that this binary exclusion method is in fact how generic images work. Generic images (or generally characterized phenomena)  are logical structures formed by eliminating everything that does not have the general properties of the category, rather than being a perfect description of the 'ideal form' of the category.  

It is taxonomically efficient to define a class in terms of the few major criteria that exclude non-members, hence allowing one to ignore the myriad minor forms of variability with the class.

Thus a generic image is what's left after all else is excluded.   It is a Boolean data structure consisting of about twenty YES/NO answers to simple questions.

The generic image is a double-negative.  To quote
Geshe Kelsang Gyatso in Understanding the Mind, page 24:

"When we think of or remember an object, say an elephant, there appears to our conceptual mind an object that is the the opposite of non-elephant. This appearance is the generic image of elephant. Even though there is no actual elephant in front of us, nevertheless there is a generic image of elephant appearing to our mind. Thus our conceptual mind apprehends elephant through the generic image of elephant. We can apply this to all other phenomena"


The generic image is therefore the appearance of a non-non-elephant.

Like a toddler with one of those wooden peg puzzles, it's almost as if when I produce a generic image of an elephant, I do so not by producing a stand-alone positive image of an elephant, but by producing an image which is specified to fit into an elephant-shaped mental hole.

We can also think of non-elephant and the generic image of an elephant as being logically complementary, just as the same stencil can produce a light figure on a dark background or dark figure on a light background, with the information content being exactly the same in both cases.


Produced from the same stencil - bunny and non-bunny are informationally equivalent.

From Debate in Tibetan Buddhism by Daniel Perdue p 299 - 300

"Thought consciousnesses are not collective engagers but eliminative engagers. Thought does not comprehend its object together with all of its uncommon characteristics (the full catalog description - S.R.), but understands its object in a general way by a process of eliminating all that is not that object.  The thought consciousness apprehending a table does not comprehend a table just as it is, for it comprehends a mere mental imputation which is an elimination of non-table...

    "...The appearing object of a thought consciousness is necessarily a generally characterized phenomenon, a permanent phenomenon.  Generally characterized phenomena are so called because their characters are realized not by way of their own entities but by way of a generality. They are realized in a general way. For instance, the thought-consciousness apprehending ice cream understands it though the elimination of non-ice cream by way of the appearance of a mental image of something which is the opposite of non ice cream.  By this process ice cream is not understood  together with all of its specific qualities but merely in a general way, as the elimination of non-ice cream. Thus, a conceptual consciousness can know something in only a general way rather than appreciating its object's freshness and fullness."


So our mind identifies an object by means of a mental generic image of that object, where the generic image, not the object itself, is the appearing object of our conceptual mind.

A conceptual mind knows its object 'for what it is' through the appearance of a generic image of that object, not by seeing the object directly.

However, the generic image is the negative of a negative, a kind of 'logical hole'.


Is the universal of ice cream formed by the exclusion of non-ice cream?

And we also need to remember that we are making visual analogies of what is fundamentally a Boolean datastructure, in the form of branch points of a taxonomic tree, for example many of the identifying qualities of ice-cream are non-visual.


Madhyamaka Philosophical aspects

In terms of the Madhyamaka's rejection of all forms of essentialism, the taxonomic method clearly demonstrates how the mind recognises objects without recourse to mapping them on to some Platonic 'ideal form' or 'inherently existing other'. In fact, the generic image is a complete opposite of a Platonic Ideal Form. For whereas the Ideal Form is inherently existent, the generic image is totally and completely empty, being derived from a 'logical hole' formed by exclusion of everything else.

Platonic forms are believed to be complete and perfect descriptions of the universals, of which individual instances are imperfect instantiations.   In contrast, generic images are minimalistic specifications containing just enough information to categorize every particular instance of an object.

A positive-to-positive matching of a perceived elephant to a Platonic image of an ideal elephant would require tedious bit-by-bit matching (how many bits of information do you need to positively specify an elephant?). The method of elimination is more efficient.  



Apoha


Excerpt from 'Dharmakīrti' by Tom Tillemans in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy   


"...Let us speak about two Buddhist approaches to bridge the scheme-content gap, “top-down”, or descriptive, approaches and “bottom-up”, or causal, approaches. By “top-down” we shall mean an account which maintains that it is because of some specific (and perhaps ingenious) features of the fictional proxy, or concept, that it pertains to particular things. Even though it does not have the ontological baggage of a real universal, the fictional proxy determines the reference of the words because the descriptive content it provides does in some way have its counterpart in the objects. Thus on a top-down approach, the fictional stand-in for a universal like “blueness” would behave like a property, a sense or a meaning, that belongs to the conceptual scheme but would nonetheless qualify and serve to pick out the real blue particulars in the world. This can be accomplished, according to Buddhist Epistemologists, because the fictional proxies are, or can be analyzed to be, “exclusions of what is other” (anyāpoha), a type of double negation which applies to particular patches of blue in the sense that each such patch is non-non-blue.[37] As Dignāga had put it in his Sāmānyaparīkṣā (“Analysis of Universals”):

    A word talks about entities only as they are qualified by the negation of other things.[38]

 
In fact, Dignāga applied his analysis both to things and to the words that express them: non-non-blue is the universal-qua-object (arthasāmānya) signified by the term “blue”, and non-non-“blue” is the universal-qua-word (śabdasāmānya) that applies to particular articulations of the word “blue”. For Dignāga, the signified-signifier (vācyavācaka) relation holds between these two quasi-universals.[39]

Why are they “quasi” and not full-fledged universals? The reasoning is not explicit in Dignāga. However, it can be plausibly reconstructed. Buddhist Epistemologists generally subscribed to the principle that mere absences of properties are of a lesser ontological status than positive things. They would stress that negative facts, like x not being blue, heavy, etc., are constituted by our mere interests (i.e., we seek a blue thing at such and such a location and come away empty-handed), and are less real than the fact that x causes perceptions of blue, a fact which is what it is objectively and independently of interests. It seems that it is this general Buddhist intuition of the unreality of absences upon which Dignāga relied. As the “exclusion of what is other” is itself only a negative property/absence of something rather than a presence, we are spared commitment to there being real universals in addition to real particulars..."





- Sean Robsville

Wednesday, 6 June 2012

Is Buddhist Philosophy Neglected and Discriminated against in the West?


Dead White Males

Here's an interesting and challenging article by philosophy professor Justin E. H. Smith, published in the New York Times.

The article raises three main questions:

(1)  Is philosophy universal, or it is socially and culturally determined?


(2)  Is non-Western philosophy justly neglected as being irrelevant to the modern world?


(3)  Should non-Western cultural traditions nevertheless be admitted into the philosophy curriculum as 'affirmative action', irrespective of their worth or relevance?



Dead Brown Males


Here's the article in full

I'll examine the points raised in more detail, from the perspective of Buddhist philosophy.




COMMENTS

(1)  Is philosophy universal, or it is socially and culturally determined?

1.1 "Non-Western philosophy is not approached on its own terms, and thus philosophy remains, implicitly and by default, Western."

In the case of Buddhist philosophy, attempting to approach it 'on its own terms' is to deny its universal applicability.   The foundational tenets of most (all?) extant schools of Buddhism are the Four Seals of Dharma, from which most of the rest of the philosophy is derived. It is a basic claim of Buddhism that these Four Seals are universal, being applicable to any sentient being, anytime, anywhere.


1.2 "What Europe does claim is a certain tradition reaching back to Greek antiquity. But even that claim is in question. The “Greek miracle” is in the end only a historiographical artifact, a result of our habit of beginning our histories when and where we do, for there was always influence from neighboring civilizations."

True, if you go back a little earlier than Plato you come to Heraclitus, who in common with Buddha, claimed that change and impermanence  are more basic aspects of reality than stasis and existence.  

However, this strand of 'process' philosophy dissappeared from the West soon after, and Platonic essentialism dominated Western thought until the work of Mendeleev and Darwin in the 19th century. 

In 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea' Daniel Dennett says ' Even today Darwin's overthrow of essentialism has not been completely assimilated .... the Darwinian mutation, which at first seemed to be just a new way of thinking about kinds in biology, can spread to other phenomena and other disciplines, as we shall see. There are persistent problems both inside and outside biology that readily dissolve once we adopt the Darwinian perspective on what makes a thing the sort of thing it is, but the tradition-bound resistance to this idea persists.'


1.3 "The difference is that philosophy is simply not like science; it is much more intricately wrapped up in cultural legacies (some have argued that science is just another cultural practice too, but I’m not prepared to say that either). Much of the difficulty of taking a rigorous and serious approach to the teaching and study of non-Western philosophy in Western philosophy departments is that many philosophers remain attached to the article of faith that philosophy is something independent of culture."

The logical conclusion of this line of thinking is that philosophy is culturally and socially determined and does not address any truths outside the realms of anthropology and sociology.  This anti-intellectual trend in university liberal arts departments (especially English departments)  caused them to become dominated by a "trendy" branch of post-modernist deconstructionism.  However, attempts to apply this fashionable nonsense to science came to grief with the Sokal HoaxThe postmodernism generator serves the same function for philosophy.




(2)  Is non-Western philosophy justly neglected as being irrelevant to the modern world?

2.1 "Second, non-Western philosophy, when it does appear in curricula, is treated in a methodologically and philosophically unsound way: it is crudely supposed to be wholly indigenous to the cultures that produce it and to be fundamentally different than Western philosophy in areas like its valuation of reason or its dependence on myth and religion.  In this way, non-Western philosophy remains fundamentally “other.”

Buddhist philosophy, in particular the Madhyamaka, is alive and well and can shed some interesting light on present day problems. However it needs to be regarded as a living methodology rather than something from the distant past, of antiquarian interest only.

Topics that can be addressed by the Madhyamaka include:






2.2 "But whatever the complexities of the world in which Plato wrote, it is at least true that the subsequent tradition that would come to be called “Western” or “European ... really does constitute, as Alfred North Whitehead put it, a “series of footnotes to Plato.” Seen from this perspective, the only reason to take European philosophy as the default tradition for our curricula is that it just happens to be, for contingent historical reasons, our tradition."

Whitehead was a process philosopher, who was commenting on the stultifying effect of Plato on 2000 years of Western philosophy. Process Philosophy holds that the underlying basis of reality is change, process and impermanence. Becoming is more basic than being, and existence is really just impermanence in slow-motion.

The converse view - Substantialism, holds that true reality is 'timeless' and based on permanent ideal forms. Change is accidental, whereas the substance is essential.

Traditional Western philosophy has always denied any full reality to change, which is conceived as only accidental and not essential. Buddhism is, of course, the ultimate Process Philosophy. According to Buddhism, all functioning phenomena are impermanent and have no essential natures or inherent existence.

However, Substantialism has dominated Western philosophy from the time of Plato until the early twentieth century, and is still deeply embedded within our culture.

There were indeed Process Philosophers among the early Greeks. For example Heraclitus pointed out that no-one can step into the same river twice. It's not the same river nor is it the same person.  Nevertheless, the early process philosophers were ignored or forgotten, and the theory of ideal forms propounded by Plato was adopted by the later Greeks and then enthusiastically embraced by the Christian Church as a justification for Creationism, and the derived doctrines of Original Sin, the Fall of Man etc.




(3)  Should non-Western cultural traditions nevertheless be admitted into the philosophy curriculum as 'affirmative action', irrespective of their worth or relevance.


3.1 "The goal of reflecting the diversity of our own society by expanding the curriculum to include non-European traditions has so far been a tremendous failure."

Surely the goal of academic philosophy departments should be to teach philosophy, not to include second rate stuff uncritically just for the sake of it.  Affirmative action is all very well for human beings, but not for ideas.  Non-western philosophy will have to justify itself just like anything else, and will be stigmatized as second rate if it gets a free ride in the interests of 'diversity' or a patronizing reaction to the dominance of Dead White Males.



3.2  "In this reality, Western academic philosophy will likely come to appear utterly parochial in the coming years if it does not find a way to approach non-Western traditions that is much more rigorous and respectful than the tokenism that reigns at present."

Quite true, but it's not going to happen unless the non-Western philosophers sell their ideas to philosophy departments as being interesting in their own right, and not something imposed out of misplaced political correctness or post-colonial self-loathing.

- Sean Robsville


Links

Indian Philosophy and the university of Hawaii (PDF)


Infinity Foundation


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